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Ayers v. State: 
MARYLAND'S 
"HATE CRIMES" 
STATUTE 
HELD NOT TO BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
BECAUSE 
PETITIONER 
LACKED STANDING 
TO MAKE A FACIAL 
CHALLENGE OF 
THE STATUTE. 
In Ayers v. State, 335 
Md. 602, 645 A.2d 22 (1994), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, in a 4-3 decision, held that 
Maryland's "hate crimes" stat-
ute, Maryland Annotated Code 
article 27, Section 470A(b )(3)(i), 
was not unconstitutional as ap-
plied to the facts of this case. 
The court did not reach the ques-
tion of whether the statute is 
indefinite and has a chilling ef-
fect on the exercise of First 
Amendment liberties because 
the court held that Ayers lacked 
standing to make such a chal-
lenge of the statute. Nonethe-
less, by so holding, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland sent a 
strong message to Maryland cit-
izens that crimes motivated by 
racial prejudice will not be tol-
erated. 
On the evening of March 
2, 1992, Petitioner John 
Randolph Ayers and his friend, 
Sean Riley, discussed a racial 
incident that occurred at an area 
7-Eleven store several nights 
earlier in which Ayers confront-
ed a black male teenager, shout-
ed racial epithets at him and 
knocked him to the ground. In 
addition, Ayers shouted racial 
epithets at a black female teen-
ager and chased her. After dis-
cussing this earlier incident, 
Ayers and Riley saw two black 
women walking and began to 
chase them. Riley chased one 
woman, Myrtle Guillory, and 
Ayers chased the other, Johnnie 
Mae McCrae. Guillory man-
aged to safely reach a friend's 
house and called the police; 
Ayers abducted McCrae, 
dragged her into the woods, 
threatened to kill her, and at-
tempted to set her on fire by 
spraying charcoal lighter fluid 
on her. Ayers was indicted in 
the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County for assault, assault 
with intent to maim, kidnap-
ping, conspiracy to commit a 
racially motivated crime, and 
committing a racially motivated 
crime in violation of the "Hate 
Crimes" statute, Section 
470A(b)(3)(i). 
At trial, Guillory and 
McCrae testified as to the inci-
dent. Riley, testifYingasa State's 
witness, said that he and Ayers 
went out that evening to find 
black people to beat up because 
they were angry about the 7-
Eleven incident that had oc-
curred several nights before. In 
addition, Riley corroborated 
Guillory and McCrae's testimo-
ny as to the facts of the case. 
Ayers disputed all of this testi-
mony, stating that the incident 
occurred because he and Riley 
were provoked by the black 
women. During cross-exami-
nation, Ayers admitted that the 
7-Eleven confrontation was ra-
cial in nature and that he had 
chased some black people be-
cause he was upset. 
The defense made sev-
eral motions for mistrial based 
on the theories that the prosecu-
tion was trying to get Ayers to 
incriminate himself on the other 
charge and that the prosecu-
tion's use of Lisa Walker, one 
of the black teenagers from the 
7 -Eleven incident, was inadmis-
sible testimony. The trial court 
ultimately overruled each mo-
tion for mistrial, holding that 
Walker's testimony was proper 
because it tended to show mo-
tive which is an element of the 
offense of committing a racially 
motivated crime under Section 
470A(b)(3)(i). However, the 
court did givethejury a caution-
ary instruction stating that cer-
tain acts that occurred during 
the 7-Eleven incident were not 
to be considered by the jury in 
determining their ultimate deci-
sion; they were merely to estab-
lish proof Defense counsel stat-
ed that they were satisfied with 
this instruction. 
Lastly, in its instruction 
to the jury, the court made the 
following statement: "[t]hede-
fendant is also charged with the 
racially motivated crime. It is a 
crime to harass or commit a 
crime upon a person because of 
that person's race, color, reli-
gious beliefs, or national ori-
gin." In addition, the State used 
the term "harass" during its 
closing argument. Defense 
counsel did not object to the 
instruction or the closing argu-
ment. Ayers was subsequently 
found guilty on all counts and 
was sentenced to incarceration 
for a total of sixty years. 
Ayers appealed his con-
viction based on four arguments. 
First, Ayers argued that his con-
victionunder Section 470Amust 
be overturned because Section 
470A on its face violates the 
First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments in that the part of the 
statute prohibiting "harass-
ment" of someone based on 
race is unconstitutionally vague, 
fails to provide fair notice as to 
what behavior constitutes "ha-
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rassment," and creates a danger 
of arbitrary enforcement. Ayers, 
335 Md. at 619,645 A.2d at 30. 
Ayers also contended that the 
statute is overbroad because 
"harass" was not defined, and 
that the statute is a content-
based regulation of speech 
which cannot be justified. Id. 
Second, Ayers argued that the 
statute was unconstitutional as 
applied in this case because by 
allowing the 7-Eleven testimo-
ny into evidence, the court al-
lowed prejudicial and irrelevant 
testimony which prevented him 
from receiving a fair trial. Fur-
thermore, the trial judge erred 
by not weighing the probative 
value of the testimony against 
its prejudicial impact. Id. at 
620, 645 A.2d at 30-31. Third, 
Ayers attacked the sufficiency 
of evidence presented to con-
vict him under Section 470A, 
arguing that the only evidence 
that his acts were racially moti-
vated came from his accom-
plice, Riley, and therefore his 
conviction violated the rule that 
a person may not be convicted 
on the uncorroborated testimo-
ny of an accomplice. Id. at 621, 
645 A.2d at 3l. Ayers' final 
argument was that the court 
abused its discretion in sentenc-
ing him to a sixty year prison 
term which constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment. Id. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari prior to re-
view by the court of special 
appeals. 
In its analysis of Ayers' 
first argument, the court of ap-
peals noted that Ayers was not 
charged under the harassment 
portion of Section 470A. Ayers 
acknowledged this but argued 
that the jury may have convict-
ed him of harassment based on 
the court's instruction and the 
State's closing argument which 
both mentioned the word "ha-
rass." Id. at 626, 645 A.2d at 
33. The court pointed out that 
Ayers never raised any objec-
tion to the use of the term "ha-
rass" by the court and the State, 
and therefore Ayers was pre-
cluded from raising this issue on 
appeal. Id. at 627-28,645 A.2d 
at 34. In addition, the court 
refused to believe that using the 
word "harass" in the jury in-
struction and the closing argu-
ment was sufficient to lead the 
jury to conclude that Ayers was 
charged with, and could be con-
victed for, mere harassment. Id. 
at 628, 645 A.2dat34-35. Last-
ly, the court held that the record 
was devoid of evidence that, 
during the attack ofthe victims, 
Ayers was engaged in any sem-
blance of constitutionally pro-
tected speech that was consid-
ered by the jury in determining 
his guilt. Id. at 627,645 A.2d at 
34. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that "Ayers lack[ed] 
standing to challenge the stat-
ute facially on the basis that the 
harassment prong of Section 
470A [was] vague and over-
broad." Id. at 629, 645 A.2d at 
35. 
As to Ayers' second ar-
gument, the court of appeals 
carefully reiterated the general 
rule that "evidence of a defen-
dant's prior criminal acts may 
not be introduced to prove guilt 
of the offense for which the 
--------
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defendant is on trial" because 
ofthe danger that the defendant 
will not be able to receive a fair 
trial. Id. at 630-31,645 A.2d at 
35. The court, though, noted 
that several exceptions exist to 
this general rule, one being that 
evidence of other crimes is ad-
missible if it tends to establish 
motive. Id. at 631,645 A.2d at 
36. In prior cases, the court held 
that evidence of another crime 
is admissible if the other crime 
tends to directly prove the guilt 
of the defendant in the case at 
hand, or if the other crime is so 
linked with the crime at hand 
that one cannot be proven with-
outtheother. Id. at631-32, 645 
A.2d at 36 (citing Bryant v. 
State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 
502 (1955) and Ross v. State, 
276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 
(1976)). The court outlined a 
three-step procedure to be fol-
lowed by a trial court when 
determining whether to admit 
evidence of other crimes: 1) 
determine ifthe evidence is one 
of the longstanding exceptions 
to the general rule; 2) if the 
evidence is an exception, decide 
whether the defendant's involve-
ment in the other crimes is es-
tablished by clear and convinc-
ing evidence; and 3) if the sec-
ond requirement is met, weigh 
the probative value of the evi-
dence against any prejudice to-
ward the defendant that would 
result from allowing it into evi-
dence. Ayers 335 Md. at 632, 
645 A.2d at 36-37. 
In analyzing these steps, 
the court determined that the 
trial court did not err in its deter-
mination that the evidence was 
admissible because: 1) the evi-
dence was admitted to show 
motive; 2) the prosecution es-
tablished Ayers' involvement in 
the 7-Eleven incident through 
the testimony ofRiley and Walk-
er; and 3) the trial judge con-
cluded that the probative value 
of the evidence outweighed its 
prejudicial impact. Id. at 633-
35, 645 A.2d at 37-38. The 
court ultimately found that the 
trial court did not err when it 
denied defense counsel's sever-
al motions for mistrial and ad-
mitted into evidence testimony 
regarding the 7 -Eleven incident. 
With regard to Ayers' 
third argument, the court held 
that Riley's testimony was in-
deed corroborated by the testi-
mony of Walker and the various 
police officers. Id. at 638, 645 
A.2d at 39-40. Though Walker 
and the other witnesses did not 
corroborate Riley's testimony 
with regard to Ayers' motive in 
the crimes, they did corroborate 
Riley's testimony as to Ayers' 
participation in the crime. The 
court noted that if the corrobo-
rative testimony shows the par-
ticipation of the accused in the 
crime itself, "the trier of fact 
may credit the accomplice's tes-
timony even with respect to 
matters as to which no corrob-
orative testimony was ad-
duced." Id. at 638,645 A.2d at 
39. 
With regard to Ayers' 
cruel and unusual punishment 
claim, the court reviewed prior 
cases where it held that "a sen-
tence is unconstitutional only if 
it is 'grossly disproportionate' 
to the crime committed by the 
- .-- -- - ----.-_---- ------ ---===-====-:J 
defendant." Id. at 639, 645 
A.2d at 40 (quoting Thomas v. 
State, 333 Md. 84, 634 A.2d 1 
(1993)). Because the sentences 
were within the permissible stat-
utory and common law limits, 
the court held that the sentences 
were not unconstitutionally dis-
proportionate. Id. at 640, 645 
A.2d at 41. The court noted 
that a trial judge is vested with 
discretion in imposing sentenc-
es, and there was no evidence in 
the record to support the con-
clusion that an abuse of discre-
tion occurred in this case. Ayers 
at 640-41, 645 A.2d at 41. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland affirmed the deci-
sion ofthe trial court, upholding 
Maryland's "Hate Crimes" stat-
ute as applied to the facts of 
Ayers' case. Id. at 642, 645 
A.2d at 41. 
In a dissenting opinion, 
Justice Bell, joined by Justices 
Chasanow and Raker, argued 
that the 7-Eleven incident should 
not have been admitted into 
evidence because this testimo-
ny did not prove Ayers' motive 
in the case; it merely established 
Ayers as a bigot. Id. at 646-47, 
645 A.2d at 42-43. Bell wentto 
great lengths to clarify this dis-
tinction: evidence that Ayers 
was a bigot only proved that he 
was a bigot-it did not prove 
that the 7-Eleven incident was 
the precipice to the crime at 
hand, and therefore, this evi-
dence did not prove Ayers' 
motive. Id. at 651-52,645 A.2d 
at 46-48. Therefore, Bell con-
cluded that the testimony re-
garding the 7-Eleven incident 
should not have been admitted 
.- ---~-~---- -----------
into evidence, and Ayers' con-
viction based on Section 
470A(b )(3)(i) should have been 
overturned. Id. at 660, 645 
A.2d at 50-51. 
By holding that Mary-
land's "Hate Crimes" statute is 
not unconstitutional as applied 
to the facts in Ayers v. State, the 
Blaine v. Blaine: 
INDEFINITE 
ALIMONY MAY BE 
AWARDED 
PURSUANT TO 
AN EXTENSION OF 
REHABILITATIVE 
ALIMONY. 
RECENT DEVELOPIVCIENTS 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
sent a warning to all Maryland 
citizens that crimes motivated 
by racial prejudice will not be 
tolerated. In so holding, the 
core of this opinion was that 
racial prejudice, by itself, will 
not be condoned, and when it is 
coupled with the commission of 
Indefinite alimony may 
be granted upon the termination 
of a fixed period of rehabilita-
tive alimony, ifit is determined 
that circumstances have arisen 
since the divorce which would 
render termination inequitable. 
In so holding, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland in Blaine v. 
Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 646 A.2d 
413 (1994), broadened a trial 
court's discretion in extending 
indefinitely an original award of 
rehabilitative alimony under sec-
tions 11-106 and 11-107 of the 
Family Law Article of the An-
notated Code ofMaryland. Ad-
ditionally, the court concluded 
that an award of indefinite ali-
mony would be supported if the 
divorced parties' respective 
standards of living were found 
to be unconscionably disparate, 
and the formerly dependent 
spouse had made as much 
progress toward becoming self-
a crime, it will be separately 
punished. The court spoke with 
amoral conscience, and charged 
all Maryland citizens to uphold 
this moral code by respecting 
the differences of all human-
kind. 
- Andrea S. Holz 
supporting as could reasonably 
be expected. 
InNovember 1985, Ms. 
Blaine was granted an absolute 
divorce in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, and was 
awarded rehabilitative alimony 
in the amount of $800.00 per 
month for a period of sixty 
months. The alimony award 
was based on evidence that Dr. 
Blaine, Ms. Blaine's husband, 
earned a salary in excess of 
$62,000.00 a year compared to 
Ms. Blaine's income which to-
taled $10,000.00 a year. In 
granting a fixed period of alimo-
ny, the circuit court took into 
consideration the fact that Ms. 
Blaine was working towards a 
master's degree in health pro-
motion counseling, which she 
anticipated would lead to a po-
sitionearning$40,OOO.00ayear. 
Approximately five 
years later, Ms. Blaine made a 
__ . _____ ~_ .. 2S.2/U. Ba:i:. [~.?-4S 
